Economy & Business
Red or blue?
History is of course not a reliable predictor for what may happen in the future, but the track records of US presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump and their respective political parties offer some hints as to how the next US president would approach Taiwan.
By Darryl Lupton
Will there be significant political consequences for Taiwan on 5 November when US elections take place? Probably not the kind of (political) fireworks that are used to commemorate Guy Fawkes Night in Britain on the same date. Yet, it is an election that will be closely watched around the world, particularly by Taiwanese as the new American leader and political party they represent will influence the status in the Taiwan Strait.
This year, the Taiwan Relations Act (TWA) marked “45 years of confusion”, as political commentator Dean Karalekas described the anniversary. This US congressional document is a guideline for the US government and does not actually guarantee US protection from an attack by mainland China on Taiwan. The TWA is open to interpretation and the next president, as commander in chief, will ultimately decide if the US will come to Taiwan’s aid if attacked or ‘quarantined’ by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A closer examination of political statements, previous policies, and congressional votes, among other markers, ought to provide insight into what Taiwan can expect from the next (2025) US administration.
Under the Trump administration of 2017-2021, a more aggressive approach was taken with China across the board. This especially focused on trade, with Trump decrying the massive trade imbalance between the two economic giants. Regarding Taiwan, there were significant arms sales such as F-16 fighter jets, M1A2T Abrams tanks and advanced missile systems like the Harpoon coastal defence systems. Besides the TRA obliging the US to make sure Taiwan can adequately defend itself against a PRC attack, Trump would see this as just good business by boosting US arms sales. Yet his administration would support Taiwan in other ways: the Taiwan Travel Act (2018) encouraged and facilitated visits between US and Taiwanese officials, further strengthening diplomatic ties. In addition, the administration supported Taiwan’s participation in international organisations where statehood wasn’t a requirement, such as the World Health Assembly. There was also a strengthening of the Indo-Pacific strategy that sought to counter China’s influence in the region by the US Navy’s freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Taiwan Strait. However, the most recent statements by Trump are less encouraging for Taiwan. He has taken umbrage to the idea that the US lost computer chip manufacturing to the island nation and now needs to subsidise the new semiconductor foundry being built in Arizona by the world’s most advanced contract chip manufacturer, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Trump has also suggested that Taiwan pay for protection, the US military being akin to an insurance company. In fact Taiwan has increased its military budget to 2.5% of GDP for 2024 (about $19 billion), showing that it takes its defence more seriously than almost all the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries. Moreover, a substantial amount of this budget goes to the US military industrial complex that sells Taiwan arms. David Sacks, a fellow for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, believes this attitude “epitomizes Trumpism because it reflects his purely transactional view of foreign policy.”
US allies became accustomed to this transactional approach from Trump during his presidency and so this is no surprise for Taiwan. It also opens the possibility that if he becomes president again, Trump may leverage Taiwan as a bargaining chip to gain better trade deals with China. Interestingly, this was broached by Peking University strategists in a Foreign Affairs article in August this year. They indicate that Beijing would not likely accept and Trump may well be persuaded by his advisors against attempting this gambit. Republicans in general are not staunch supporters of supporting Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s invasion. JD Vance, Trump’s vice-president pick, would rather the weapons the US is sending to Ukraine be saved instead for Taiwan’s defence against a possible People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attack. This is a more isolationist approach to land wars in Europe but also a strategy advanced by renowned international relations expert, John Mearsheimer. He believes that the US should keep its powder dry (and stockpiled) in anticipation of a conflict with China. According to this view, spending money, diverting military aid and focusing on helping Ukraine repel Russia is only depleting US resources. Nevertheless, Nikki Haley, the former US Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), on a recent trip to Taiwan didn’t advocate for this isolationist approach, instead emphasising the US’s need to continue a global presence and engage with its allies. In fact, reducing aid to Ukraine could result in Russia later testing NATO elsewhere in Europe, the Baltic states for example. This would be more far-reaching militarily and costly in lives for the US than ongoing support for Ukraine.
Winning friends and influencing them to support your interests is integral to diplomacy. Employing different methods like ‘carrots and sticks’ to incentivise or strongarm reluctant allies is part of the diplomatic dance and a degree of largesse and magnanimity can cement alliances. Trump has legitimately insisted that NATO members reach the minimum of 2% GDP spending on defence and that Asian allies (for example, South Korea and Japan) pull their weight as part of the ‘Hub and Spokes model’ consisting of a network of alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. However, it has taken the Biden administration much time and effort to rebuild relationships in this region after neglect by the previous administration. A new three-way defence pact has been signed with Japan and South Korea, quite an achievement considering their history. “We’ve deepened our alliances and partnerships abroad in ways that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago,” stressed Kurt Campbell, the new deputy secretary of state and top Asia policy official in the White House. If Taiwan is attacked by China, will a Trump administration be capable of galvanising its regional allies to persuade China to back off?
The Democratic Party with Biden-Harris at the forefront has been rebuilding the ‘pivot to Asia’ initiated by Barack Obama. The Democratic Party asserts its ongoing commitment to strengthening alliances to counter China's attempts to coerce neighbouring countries and to preserve the global order that safeguards US security and prosperity. Moreover, the party emphasises President Biden's dedication to upholding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, in accordance with the US One China policy. This policy is informed by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. Ryan Hass, a US researcher and former White House official, believes that Harris won’t digress from Biden’s Taiwan policy and views working with ‘friends’ as important; furthermore, she will leverage her Asian roots to help connect with the region. In order to ‘maintain the peace’, Harris will need to persuade US Congress members that ‘poking the Chinese dragon’ is not advantageous for stability in the Taiwan Strait. A long-term writer on Taiwan, Nicholas Kristof, in high level interviews established that, "Many prominent people in Taiwan told me that while they appreciate American moral and military support, they also fear that hot-headed, China-bashing Americans don’t understand the region and may make things worse." As a consequence, 62% of Taiwanese in a 2023 poll felt that Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan had made Taiwan less secure.
Sean King, senior vice president at New York consultancy firm Park Strategies, noted that Harris “is tough, she’s smart, and she would employ our allies against China and not just go along.” He noted that in 2022, Harris had “called out Beijing’s coercive behaviour in the Taiwan Strait”. What’s more, her VP pick, Tim Walz, has extensive experience in China and knows the history, people and culture well. He believes in balancing cooperation and criticism in order to successfully engage with Beijing. With bipartisan support for tough measures on China and support for Taiwan, there is unlikely to be a very different approach from Biden’s China policy.
Let’s examine how the US public and more specifically the US Congress has regarded the Taiwan issue. Although public support in the United States for deploying troops in a conflict over Taiwan is generally declining across both major political parties, a significant positive aspect for Taiwan is the robust support among Republican leaders, with 73% endorsing military intervention when no other options remain. While bipartisan support for Taiwan persists, it is important to note that historically, the issue has garnered stronger backing from Republicans. This is largely due to the GOP's conservative base, which is firmly anti-communist and ideologically committed to defending democratic nations. However, statistics do vary across the age groups. To illustrate, Republican-leaning respondents under 50 are equally supportive (42%) and opposed (42%) to the idea of militarily supporting Taiwan. Given recent developments in both public and private interactions between the United States and Taiwan, it is undeniable that Taiwan continues to be a priority for the American public. In April 2024, the US Congress voted on the long-delayed Foreign Aid Bill to Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel. Taiwan had by far the most support of the three nations with 385 of the 420 members voting in favour of aid. Interestingly, the majority of those against aid to Taiwan were hard-right Republicans. This bipartisan support bodes well for Taiwan receiving more support from the next administration, regardless of the party in power, though Democrats are more unanimous in their support for Taiwan.
The analysis shows that whichever party wins the US election in November, it is very likely to support Taiwan. Trump would be more transactional and would likely pressure Taiwan to boost its defence budget further. Yet it’s likely that his advisors would stress the importance of US interests in strongly backing Taiwan due to strategic reasons and the vital role that Taiwan plays in the high-level semiconductor supply chain. There would also be the usual unpredictability of Trump’s political behaviour, which might keep Beijing more unbalanced. Trump’s realpolitik approach, putting ‘America First’ might antagonise allies, making it harder to enrol their support for Taiwan. If Harris were to win, it appears that it would be largely the same policy approach that Biden laid out. That is, more liberal internationalist by building alliances and engaging with Beijing through channels like the US National Security Advisor recently meeting with his Chinese counterpart to stabilise relations between the two strategic competitors. The additional support of regional allies may prove to be vital as extra deterrence against a PLA attack on Taiwan. Whatever the election outcome is in November, it will be more favourable for Taiwan than for China. As the Peking University strategists recently wrote, “Beijing is preparing itself for the outcome of the US elections with great caution and limited hope.”
Dr Darryl Lupton is an Australian academic who was a 2023 Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ research scholar affiliated with National Taiwan University.
